[quoted text, click to view] > Problem is that thousands of spams were sent with his account, and
> now they are bouncing and bouncing and bouncing...
To be sure. Of course, the same spam could have been sent through any
server; his (E)SMTP credentials need not have been compromised to do
so. Naturally, it increases the penetration of the spam if it is sent
from a legitimate and otherwise well-configured server.
If you're trying to absorb this storm of NDRs for a single recipient,
why don't you just move his e-mail alias into another mailbox and sort
through it there? There's no reason to turn off NDRs for the entire
server just because _one person_ is receiving a storm.
[quoted text, click to view] > NDAs though initially useful, are today just a clogging, resource
> wasting feature that virtually every email user ignores.
There's scant real-world evidence for your contention, but I
understand that you are frustrated because you're cleaning up after
your user's easily-guessed password or their gullibility in going to a
phishing site.
Nonetheless, your enemy is not the NDR, it's the security breach. In
fact, NDRs are often the sole signaling device that alerts us to
remote Joe Jobs and local mailbox compromises (in addition to their
primary notification function for legit e-mail).
--Sandy
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Sanford Whiteman, Chief Technologist
Broadleaf Systems, a division of
Cypress Integrated Systems, Inc.